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CIRCUIT-SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX
JEFFREY S. KINSLER'
INTRODUCTION
The federal government's power to tax is omnipotent. It can assess
taxes in any amount on anything or anyone for any reason.' For all prac-
tical purposes, the Constitution prescribes only one limit on the federal
government's power to tax: the Uniformity Clause, which requires that
indirect taxes, such as income and excise taxes, be "uniform throughout
the United States ... ,,2 Uniformity should not be confused, however,
with fairness or equality. There is no requirement that rich people pay the
same tax as poor, or that oil companies pay the same tax as pharmaceuti-
cal companies, or that married couples pay the same tax as singles. The
Uniformity Clause merely requires geographic uniformity. 3 It is violated,
therefore, only if the federal government imposes a different tax on the
residents of one state than it imposes on the residents of another.
It is exceedingly rare for a federal tax law to violate the Uniformity
Clause.4 The Internal Revenue Code does not fix different taxes for dif-
ferent states, as Congress has carefully crafted the tax laws to avoid geo-
graphical distinctions.5 Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") has not always been so careful. In recent years, the IRS has
adopted a practice of applying different tax laws to different states. This
t Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law. Director, Native American Tax Law
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Law.
I. See, e.g., Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1960) (noting
that Congress' taxing power "is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation"
(quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916))); United States v. Robinson, 107
F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Mich. 1952) ("Congress may select any object, occupation or transaction as
the subject matter of an indirect tax.").
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I. The Constitution also requires that direct taxes be appor-
tioned among the states, but this limitation has little practical significance and was largely repealed
by the Sixteenth Amendment. See discussion infra Part I.B. In addition, the federal government is
barred from taxing exports, but this limitation has a very limited scope. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5;
see discussion infra Part I.A.
3. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 (1945) ("[T]he uniformity in excise taxes exacted
by the Constitution is geographical uniformity, not uniformity of intrinsic equality and operation.").
4. In fact, the Supreme Court has never used the Uniformity Clause to invalidate a tax law.
Thomson Multimedia, Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
5. But see United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 77 (1983) (upholding tax on domestic oil
despite the fact that it exempted oil produced "from a well located on the northerly side of the divide
of the Alaska-Aleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest point on the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System" (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 4994(e))); Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1340-41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (upholding Harbor Maintenance Tax despite exemptions for
Alaska and Hawaii, where exemptions were not discriminatory in nature).
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occurs when the IRS issues a formal opinion declaring that it will not
enforce certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in states located
within certain federal circuits.
6
This Article submits that the IRS's non-uniform application of the
tax law violates the Uniformity Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In an
endeavor to substantiate this hypothesis, Part I will analyze the constitu-
tional restrictions on the federal government's power to tax and the effect
of the Sixteenth Amendment on those restrictions. Part II will offer ex-
amples of the IRS's practice of applying tax laws in a non-uniform man-
ner. Part III will demonstrate why the IRS's practice violates the Uni-
formity Clause. Part IV will propose a practical and constitutional solu-
tion to the IRS's arguably unconstitutional practice.
The IRS is not totally to blame for its circuit-specific application of
the tax law. The true culprit is a judicial system in which the Internal
Revenue Code is interpreted, often finally, by thirteen different federal
circuit courts. As a result of this structure, the IRS is often forced to ap-
ply different tax laws in different circuits in violation of the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution.
There is a simple, practical, and constitutional solution to this prob-
lem. This Article proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)
(2000), by adding a provision granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal
tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Such an
amendment would not only unify and stabilize the tax law, it would per-
manently solve the Uniformity Clause problem identified in this Article.
Whether the IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax law vio-
lates the Uniformity Clause is an issue of first impression. It has not been
addressed by courts, except for an oblique reference in Peony Park, Inc.
v. 0'Malley,7 but that court sidestepped the issue by refusing to assume,
despite unambiguous evidence, that the IRS was applying different tax
laws in different states. 8 It also has been largely ignored by scholars, but
that is not altogether surprising since tax scholars, as Professor Bittker
explains, generally pay little attention to constitutional law. "[I]n law
school courses, once the instructor has finished flogging Eisner v.
Macomber, [252 U.S. 189 (1920),] the class usually moves on to the
'real' issues of federal income taxation, leaving the Constitution, includ-
ing the sixteen [sic] amendment, behind."9
6. See discussion infra Part U.
7. 121 F. Supp. 690, 695 (D. Neb. 1954), affld, 223 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1955).
8. Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695 ("Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement
policy contrary to the statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.").
9. Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41
TAX LAW. 3, 4 (1987). Professor Bittker, Professor of Law Emeritus at Yale Law School, is one of
the leading tax scholars in America. See also Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect Taxes": The
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1. THE CONSTITUTION'S TAXATION PROVISIONS
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government did not
possess the power to tax individuals or property.10 Rather, the federal
government was forced to rely exclusively upon state governments for
revenue, a mechanism that quickly proved ineffectual.
Congress could not, under the old confederation, raise money by
taxes, be the public exigencies ever so pressing and great. They had
no coercive authority-if they had, it must have been exercised
against the delinquent states, which would be ineffectual, or termi-
nate in a separation. Requisitions were a dead letter, unless the state
legislatures could be brought into action; and when they were, the
sums raised were very disproportional. Unequal contributions or
payments engendered discontent, and fomented state-jealousy. I
The inability of the federal government to raise revenue was one of
the reasons for the Constitutional Convention of 1787.12 At that conven-
tion, the Framers of our current Constitution vested in Congress broad,
general powers to lay and collect taxes. 13 These powers are contained in
the first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides:
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States ....
Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 114 (1999) (noting
"the existence of an uneasy relationship between constitutional law scholars and tax scholars").
10. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 268 n.4 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A major
weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confederation was the central government's
inability to collect taxes directly. Remedying this defect was thus one of the most important purposes
of the Constitutional Convention." (citations omitted)). In the Articles of Confederation, the power
to tax was conferred upon the states.
All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common de-
fence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall
be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in
proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for any per-
son, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated accord-
ing to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time di-
rect and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the au-
thority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon
by the United States in Congress assembled ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII, (U.S. 1781).
I1. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796) (seriatim opinions) (upholding
federal tax on carriages as a uniform indirect tax).
12. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1880) ("Many of the provisions of the
Articles of Confederation of 1777 were embodied in the existing organic law. They provided for a
common treasury and the mode of supplying it with funds. The latter was by requisitions upon the
several States. The delays and difficulties in procuring the compliance of the States, it is known, was
one of the causes that led to the adoption of the present Constitution.").
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
14. Id. The Supreme Court has held that Congress' power to tax is not limited to the other
enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, but extends to any tax that is in the general welfare of the
nation. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Court held
that the Framers intended to give Congress the power to tax in "its fullest extent." 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
533, 540 (1868). The Court continued:
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The federal government's authority to tax "is exhaustive and em-
braces every conceivable power of taxation ....,,5 The expansive nature
of this power was acknowledged by the Supreme Court as early as 1796
when Justice Paterson observed that it was "obviously the intention of
the framers of the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power
over every species of taxable property, except exports."' 6 More than a
century later, Justice Cardozo, elaborating on the breadth of the federal
government's power to tax, stated: "The subject-matter of taxation open
to the power of the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the
power of the states, though the method of apportionment may at times be
different. . . . [It] include[s] every form of tax appropriate to sover-
eignty."
17
The Taxing Clause is construed liberally and flexibly in favor of the
federal government. 18 Any tax designed to promote the general welfare
of the nation is constitutional, and it is for Congress, not the courts, to
decide which taxes promote the general welfare. "The discretion belongs
to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment."' 9 Specifically, the power to choose
"one welfare over another," or a particular welfare over a general one,
lies with Congress.20 Accordingly, Congress has broad powers to tax for
The comprehensiveness of the power, thus given to Congress, may serve to explain,
at least, the absence of any attempt by members of the Convention to define, even in de-
bate, the terms of the grant. The words used certainly describe the whole power, and it
was the intention of the Convention that the whole power should be conferred. The defi-
nition of particular words, therefore, became unimportant.
Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 541.
15. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. I, 12 (1916) (upholding 1913 federal income
tax act, the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166).
16. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 176. Justice Paterson continued:
The term taxes, is generical, and was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in
all cases of taxation. The general division of taxes is into direct and indirect. Although
the latter term is not to be found in the Constitution, yet the former necessarily implies it.
Indirect stands opposed to direct.
Id.
17. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) (upholding taxes on
employers pursuant to Social Security Act, ch. 531,49 Stat. 620 (1935)).
18. La Croix v. United States, II F. Supp. 817, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 1935) ("It is the opinion of
this court that it was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution that this clause, giving the right to
levy taxes to pay the public debts, provide for the common defense and general welfare, was to be
applied as a liberal and flexible means of providing for the welfare of the United States in times of
disaster; provided, of course, that no other and restraining clause was violated.").
19. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49
Stat. 620 (1935)); Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) ("The basic principle that must
govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments
of monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the
general public welfare in one way and not another are 'not confided to the courts. The discretion
belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise
of judgment."' (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640)).
20. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 ("The line must still be drawn between one welfare and an-
other, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula
in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at
large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress,
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the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional pro-
visions.
[Als this court repeatedly has held, the power to tax carries with it
'the power to embarrass and destroy'; may be applied to every object
within its range 'in such measure as Congress may determine'; en-
ables that body 'to select one calling and omit another, to tax one
class of property and to forbear to tax another'; and may be applied
in different ways to different objects .... 21
The federal government's power to tax, however, is not without
limits. According to a common reading of the Constitution, "Congress
cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of appor-
tionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. 22 Thus, the Con-
stitution prescribes three limits on the federal government's power to
tax.23 The first limitation prevents Congress from taxing exports. 24 The
second limitation mandates that capitation taxes and other direct taxes be
apportioned among the several states based on population. The third
limitation guarantees that duties, imposts, excises, and other indirect
taxes be uniform throughout the United States.26 In order to provide a
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is
now familiar law.").
21. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 256 (1920) (upholding federal income tax despite the fact
that it effectively reduced the salaries of Article III judges, which the Constitution generally prohib-
its) (citations omitted).
22. Kelly v. Lewellyn, 274 F. 108, 110 (W.D. Pa. 1921); accord Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at
174 ("[Tlwo rules are prescribed for [the power to tax], namely, uniformity and apportionment:
Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other
direct taxes, by the second rule.").
23. Tax laws are also subject to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Such clauses
are rarely used, however, to invalidate tax laws. See, e.g., Mathews, 429 U.S. at 189 (finding that
Social Security Act, which treats divorced males differently than females, does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause); Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 20 (holding that 1913 income tax act, which was retroac-
tive, did not violate the Due Process Clause).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
25. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
26. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In 1916, the Supreme Court observed that the requirements of appor-
tionment and uniformity are not so much limitations "upon the complete and all-embracing authority
to tax," but "simply regulations concerning the mode" by which the plenary power is to be exerted.
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 13. Later decisions have called this liberal interpretation of the Uniformity
Clause into question.
The fact that the Supreme Court in 1916 categorized the Uniformity Clause as a regula-
tion does not convince this Court that the Uniformity Clause is not also a limitation as the
Supreme Court used the word in Flast [v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)]. The Uniformity
Clause restricts the method by which the Congress can assess taxes. Thus, it is a limita-
tion on the means by which Congress can tax. This view of the Uniformity Clause is con-
sistent with other Supreme Court decisions. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80,
103 S.Ct. 2239, 2242, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) ("The Uniformity Clause conditions Con-
gress' power to impose indirect taxes."); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150, 31
S. Ct. 342, 348, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911) (the Uniformity Clause allows Congress "to lay and
collect ... taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, upon which the limitation is that they shall
be uniform throughout the United States."); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85[-86], 20
S.Ct. 747, 765, 44 L.Ed. 969 (1900) ("The tax imposed upon the distiller is in the nature
of an excise, and the only limitation upon the power of Congress in the imposition of
taxes of this character is that they shall be 'uniform throughout the United States."').
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complete picture of the constitutional limits on Congress's power to tax,
all three of these limitations are examined in the next sections. The Uni-
formity Clause, however, is the primary focus of this Article.
A. The Export Clause
The Export Clause plainly states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
Articles exported from any State."927 It categorically bars Congress from
imposing taxes on exports.28 "[T]he Export Clause was originally pro-
posed by delegates to the Federal Convention from the Southern States,
who feared that the Northern States would control Congress and would
use taxes and duties on exports to raise a disproportionate share of fed-
eral revenues from the South. ' 29 To allay such fears, the Framers
couched the Export Clause in unconditional language that protects all
exports from federal tax burdens. 30  Along with the Import-Export
Clause,31 which prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from
laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, 32 the Export
Clause was "one of the compromises which. . . made possible the adop-
tion of the Constitution.,
33
The Export Clause "specifically prohibits Congress from regulating
international commerce through export taxes, [and] disallows any at-
tempt to raise federal revenue from exports, ... [but] has no direct effect
on the way the States treat imports and exports. 34 In other words:
[The Constitution] left to the states a greater power over exports than
congress had; for, by the ninth section of the first article, they were
Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (foot-
notes omitted), afftd, reh 'g granted, affd in part, rev'd in part, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
28. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998). 'The Clause, how-
ever, does not rule out a 'user fee,' provided that the fee lacks the attributes of a generally applicable
tax or duty and is, instead, a charge designed as compensation for Government-supplied services,
facilities, or benefits." United States Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363 (citing Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372,
375-76 (1876)).
29. United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859 (1996) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95, 305-08, 359-63 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)). Mr. Gerry, a
delegate from Massachusetts, thought the legislature would ruin the country if entrusted with the
power to tax exports, by exercising the power partially, raising one part of the country and depress-
ing another. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 307. Mr. Mason, a delegate
from Virginia, "urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying taxes ... [so] that no
tax should be laid on exports." Id. at 305.
30. IBM, 517 U.S. at 859-60; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 292-93 (1901) ("So it
is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended, not merely that exports should not be made a
source of revenue to the national government, but that the national government should put nothing in
the way of burden upon such exports. If all exports must be free from national tax or duty, such
freedom requires, not simply an omission of a tax upon the articles exported, but also a freedom
from any tax which directly burdens the exportation; and, as we have shown, a stamp tax on a bill of
lading, which evidences the export, is just as clearly a burden on the exportation as a direct tax on
the article mentioned in the bill of lading as the subject of the export.").
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
32. Id.
33. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290.
34. IBM, 517 U.S. at 859.
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prohibited from taxing exports, without any qualification, even by the
consent of the states; whereas, with the consent of congress, any state
can impose such a tax by a law, subject to the conditions pre-
scribed.
35
The Export Clause is not limited to taxes imposed exclusively on
exports. It also applies to "the imposition of a generally applicable, non-
discriminatory federal tax on goods in export transit. '' 36 That is, the Ex-
port Clause exempts "from federal taxation not only export goods, but
also services and activities closely related to the export process. 37 Ac-
cordingly, even those taxes that are imposed equally on exports and im-
ports or other articles of commerce may be prohibited by the Export
Clause,38 for exports are not to be obstructed by the burdens of federal
taxation.3 9
The Export Clause does not, however, preclude federal taxation of
pre-export goods and services. 40 Thus, general excise taxes on property,
such as a tax on all distilled spirits, and income taxes derived from the
exporting business, are not prohibited by the Export Clause,4 1 as that
Clause applies only to taxes laid on exports, or matters related to exports,
and not on taxes laid generally on the manufacture or handling of prod-
ucts.
42
Although the Export Clause is a genuine limitation on the federal
government's power to tax, its scope is quite limited.4 3 The Export
Clause applies only to international commerce, an and is limited to goods,
35. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 153 (1837) (Baldwin, J., concurring);
see also Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 276 (1900).
36. IBM, 517 U.S. at 845.
37. Id. at 846.
38. Id. at 860 ("The better reading [of the Export Clause], that adopted by our earlier cases, is
that the Framers sought to alleviate their concerns by completely denying to Congress the power to
tax exports at all."). To determine whether a tax is an export tax, as compared to a general tax on
property, a "court must examine the immediacy of exportation" and the "proximity of the tax im-
posed to the value of the articles exported." United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l
Trade 1284, 1294 (1995), affd, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), a f'd, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
39. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Robertson, 14 F. Supp. 463, 464 (M.D.N.C. 1935). Al-
though the Supreme Court has allowed states to impose nondiscriminatory taxes under the Import-
Export Clause and the Commerce Clause, it has consistently barred all federal taxes, discriminatory
and nondiscriminatory, under the Export Clause. IBM, 517 U.S. at 850-62.
40. Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904) ("The true construction of the constitutional
provision is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and
does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which
rest upon all property similarly situated.").
41. Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471, 478 (1892) (upholding tax on distilled spirits,
some of which are exported); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174 (1918) (upholding
income tax on profits derived from exporting goods).
42. United States v. W. Tex. Cottonoil Co., 155 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1946) (upholding
penalty on excess cotton, regardless of whether such cotton was sold in the United States or abroad).
43. The Sixteenth Amendment had no effect on the Export Clause. Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926) ("[T]he Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power
to any new class of subjects .... ").
44. Fla. Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331, 1335-37 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (finding Export Clause does not bar tax on interstate shipments). Exports destined for
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services, and "activities closely related to the export process. ''4 It does
not apply to passengers.46 It applies exclusively to taxes on the interna-
tional exportation of goods. As such, it plays no significant role in the
IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax law which, of course, is the
focus this Article.
B. The Apportionment Clauses
The Constitution provides that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers"47 and that "[n]o Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumera-
tion herein before directed to be taken."48 These clauses are designed to
ensure that the citizens of each state pay no more than their proportional
share of direct taxes. 49
The apportionment clauses were proposed by southern states to pre-
vent the federal government from imposing a tax on land or slaves,
which would disproportionately burden southerners.
[The southern states] possessed a large number of slaves; they had
extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A
majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them a lim-
ited territory, well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The
southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitu-
tion, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other states. Con-
gress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and
land in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so
much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the second.
To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was the reason
of introducing the clause in the Constitution .... 50
As a result, the Framers insisted that direct taxes be apportioned
among the states based on population. 5' Assume Congress, for example,
enacts a direct tax, such as a federal property tax, to raise $50 million.
U.S. territories are not subject to the Export Clause. See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324
U.S. 652, 685-86 (1945) (exports to Philippines); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 155-57
(1901) (exports to Puerto Rico).
45. IBM, 517 U.S. at 846; United States Shoe, 523 U.S. at 367 ("[T]he Export Clause allows
no room for any federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export
transit.").
46. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 200 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The
passengers on Carnival's cruise ships are neither 'articles' nor 'goods.' They are people. The appli-
cation of the Harbor Tax to them would not involve the laying of any tax upon 'Articles' exported
from any state. 'Articles' and 'goods' relate to items of commerce, not people. To apply the Export
Clause to people would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Clause.").
47. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
48. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
49. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 96 (1900); see also Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 178
("[E]ach state will be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax, and credited for its payments.").
50. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177.
51. Id. at 174.
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For this tax to be constitutional, its burden must be apportioned among
the fifty states based on population.52 A sparsely populated state like
South Dakota cannot be required to pay the same amount (e.g., $1 mil-
lion) as a densely populated state like California. Rather, the citizens of
each state must pay only a proportional amount of the federal tax burden
based on that state's population.53
Not long after the Constitutional Convention, it became apparent
that compliance with the apportionment clauses would be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve:
It appears to me, that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by the rule
of apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice. For ex-
ample: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars
each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one
State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000. The owners of
carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax of owners in the
other. A. in one State, would pay for his carriage 8 dollars, but B. in
the other state [sic], would pay for his carriage, 80 dollars.
54
Compliance with the apportionment clauses, therefore, was a formidable
obstacle to direct federal taxes, ultimately prompting the Sixteenth
Amendment.
1. What Are Direct Taxes?
Originally, direct taxes were defined to include only capitation taxes
(e.g., poll taxes) 55 and taxes on real property imposed solely by reason of
ownership by the taxpayer.56 Later, the Supreme Court in Polock v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust C0.57 held that taxes on personal property, and
taxes on the income from both real and personal property, such as rents
and interest on bonds, were direct taxes.58
Direct taxes are levied upon persons and their possession or enjoy-
ment of rights, whereas indirect taxes are levied upon events, such as
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, cl. 3 & 9, cl. 4.
53. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 174.
54. Id.
55. Even if a poll tax were to pass muster under the apportionment clauses, it is highly
unlikely that a poll tax could survive an equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that Virginia's poll tax violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Those of the direct kind, which princi-
pally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or
the number of the people, may serve as a standard."); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 176 (concluding that
direct taxes are limited to capitations and taxes on land); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160,
166 (4th Cir. 1962) ("A direct tax is a tax on real or personal property, imposed solely by reason of
its being owned by the taxpayer.").
57. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
58. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 583.
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transferring, exchanging, or usingproperty. 59 Indirect taxes are not sub-
ject to the apportionment clauses. Examples of direct taxes include lo-
cal property taxes, state ad valorem taxes, and, presumably, European-
style wealth taxes.61 These taxes are imposed directly on the taxpayer or
his or her property, but they are not imposed on transfers or exchanges of
property.62
For all practical purposes, there are only two types of direct taxes:
capitation taxes, such as poll taxes, and taxes on real and personal prop-
erty ownership, such as real estate or ad valorem taxes.63 As a result, the
apportionment clauses have little relevance to modern federal taxation
because there are no federal poll taxes or federal property taxes.64 In-
stead, the federal government raises most, if not all, of its internal reve-
nue via indirect taxes, such as excise taxes, death taxes, and income
taxes.65 The Supreme Court has consistently held that excise and death
taxes are not direct taxes and, therefore, are not subject to the apportion-
ment clauses.66 The law has been less certain, however, with regard to
income taxes.
Prior to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, there was consid-
erable uncertainty over whether income taxes were direct or indirect.67
As early as 1874, a federal court held that a tax upon income was a duty
rather than a direct tax, and thus, federal income taxes were not required
to be apportioned among the states.68 The Supreme Court affirmed this
59. Id. at 558 ("[A]II taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one
else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon
property holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by
such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes."); Knowlton, 178 U.S. at
47 ("Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyments of fights;
indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.").
60. David F. Shores, Rethinking Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions, 53 TAX LAW. 35,
35 n.1 (1999) ("Indirect taxes are subject to the uniformity clause, but not to the apportionment
clauses.").
61. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (finding direct taxes limited to capitations and taxes on
land).
62. Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1955) ("Such taxes bear directly upon
persons, upon their possession and enjoyment of fights, whereas indirect taxes are levied upon the
happening of an event such as an exchange or transmission of property.").
63. Hytlon, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J., seriatim opinion) (stating direct taxes "contem-
plated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND.").
64. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 200 (As-
pen Publishers, Inc. 1997).
65. Howard Schragin, U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States: A Victory for U.S.-Canada Maritime
Trade, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1764, 1771 (1996).
66. See, e.g., Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 54-55 (upholding 1898 inheritance tax as a valid excise
tax and not a direct tax).
67. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of
"Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1070-71 (2001).
68. Smedberg v. Bentley, 22 F. Cas. 368, 370 (C.C.D.N.J. 1874) ("Under the constitutional
designation of the different kinds of taxation to which resort might be made by congress, a tax upon
incomes must be classed among the duties authorized, rather than among the direct taxes. No appor-
tionment is necessary when it is laid, and there is nothing to be done here but to sustain the demurrer
to the first count of the plaintiffs declaration, and it is ordered accordingly."). In 1868, the Supreme
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conclusion in 1880, when it held that a tax levied on personal income,
gains, and profits is an excise or duty and not a direct tax.69 From 1880 to
1895, there appeared to be a consensus that income taxes were indirect
excise taxes not subject to the apportionment clauses.7 °
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court changed course, holding that
taxes on the income derived from real property (e.g., rent) was the legal
equivalent of a direct tax on the property itself and thus must be appor-
tioned.7' As a result, the Court invalidated an income tax on rents that
was not apportioned among the states.72 In the same case, the Court ruled
that a tax on income derived from personal property was also a direct tax
and that the law imposing such a tax was unconstitutional for failure to
comply with the apportionment clauses.73 In so doing, the Court stated:
The tax imposed by sections 27 to 37, inclusive, of the act of 1894,
so far as it falls on the income of real estate, and of personal property,
being a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, and there-
fore unconstitutional and void, because not apportioned according to
representation ... are necessarily invalid.
74
Moreover, the Court found that those provisions of the Revenue Act
of 1894 taxing income derived from real and personal property were
inseparable from the remainder of the Act.75 Consequently, the Court
invalidated the entire 1894 federal income tax scheme:
We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct
tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof,
might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments,
and vocations. But this is not such an act, and the scheme must be
considered as a whole. Being invalid as to the greater part, and fol-
lowing, as the tax would, if any part were held valid, in a direction
which could not have been contemplated, except in connection with
the taxation considered as an entirety, we are constrained to conclude
that [the Act is] ... wholly inoperative and void.
76
Court held that a gross receipts tax on the amounts insured, renewed, or continued by insurance
companies was a duty or excise and not a direct tax. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445-46
(1868); see also Veazie Bank 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 546-47 (upholding a ten percent tax on notes state
banks paid to other banks).
69. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (holding income tax to be an indirect
tax).
70. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 5.3 (3d ed. 1999) ("Prior to the decision in Pollock in 1895, it had been
the general consensus that the term 'direct' tax employed in the Constitution embraced only taxes on
land (real property) and poll or capitation taxes. This consensus was firmly founded.").




75. Id. at 635-37.
76. Id. at 637.
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The Court thus concluded that a tax on a taxpayer's entire income,
if it included income derived from property, is a direct tax and, therefore,
must be apportioned among the states based on population.77
2. The Sixteenth Amendment
Pollock raised serious questions about whether income taxes were
direct or indirect taxes.78 It also continued a heated debate over whether a
federal income tax could be imposed consistent with the Constitution.79
The Sixteenth Amendment, however, rendered this debate academic.
Ratified in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration. '' 80 The purpose of the Sixteenth
Amendment was to relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion any
tax on classes of income which would require apportionment due to its
source.81 Under the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
tax income from whatever source derived-labor, real estate, personal
property, etc.-without concern for apportionment.82 Thus, the appor-
tionment clauses no longer present a barrier to federal income taxes.83
In sum, the apportionment clauses are not a barrier to federal in-
come, death, or excise taxes, and these taxes comprise most, if not all, of
the federal government's internal revenue. 84 Today, the apportionment
77. Id.
78. Subsequent decisions have generally held that taxes on income are not direct taxes. See,
e.g., Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593, 597-98 (6th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax on ac-
crued interest of notes passing to certain legatees is not a direct tax); Jones v. United States, 55 1 F.
Supp. 578, 579 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a tax on wages is not a direct tax); Krzyske v. Com-
missioner, 548 F. Supp 101, 104 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that social security taxes are not direct
taxes).
79. Jensen, supra note 67, at 1106-07.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
81. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18.
82. Id. at 17-18.
83. The apportionment clauses would still inhibit the federal government's imposition of
property or wealth taxes. Of course,
[tihere is no federal property tax. Imposition of a federal property tax would be politically
impractical because the Constitution requires that "direct" taxes be proportional to the
population of each state. Thus, if a federal property tax were imposed, people living in a
state with 50% of the country's population but only 20% of the country's property value
would still be required to pay 50% of the total federal property tax bill. The federal gov-
ernment has levied property taxes twice: in 1798 and in 1813. The taxes were appor-
tioned among the states as constitutionally required.
John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of
Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 421, 421 n.2; see also Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be
Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 269, 270 n.14 (2000) (noting that many scholars believe that a
federal wealth tax should be subject to apportionment).
84. The Supreme Court has generally assumed that once a tax is found to be outside the reach
of the apportionment clauses, it is an indirect tax subject to the Uniformity Clause. See Knowlton,
178 U.S. at 83.
[Vol. 8 1":1
2003] A NON- UNIFORM UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX
clauses would pose a barrier only to a federal property or wealth tax,
both of which are unlikely to be invoked. 85
C. The Uniformity Clause
The Uniformity Clause limits the federal government's power to
impose indirect taxes.86 It provides: "The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises .... but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ...
,87 But what does the term "uniform" mean?
The Framers of the Constitution furnished little guidance on the
meaning of "uniform., 88 The concerns giving rise to the Uniformity
Clause, however, provide some insight into its purpose. Under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the federal government lacked the power to regu-
late interstate commerce, resulting in interstate trade barriers and region-
alism. 89 Prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Americans were
accustomed to putting their respective states' interests over the interests
of the nation.90 In an effort to remedy this situation and unify the nation,
85. See Swain, supra note 83, at 421 n.2; Rakowski, supra note 83, at 265.
86. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 (1983). By contrast, the apportionment clauses
limit the federal government's power to impose direct taxes. See discussion supra Part I.B.
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I (emphasis added). The Uniformity Clause applies only to the
50 states and not to Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories. Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287
(1901) (upholding duty on merchandise imported from Puerto Rico). The Uniformity Clause has
received little attention from the courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never invalidated a tax law
on the basis of the Uniformity Clause. As Professor Bittker aptly states, the Uniformity Clause
"might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal income tax, but ... has shriveled
away to a mere flyspeck." Bittker, supra note 9, at 9.
88. There are two other uniformity clauses in the Constitution: the Bankruptcy Clause and the
Naturalization Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 4. Reference to either of these clauses is unhelpful
in defining "uniform." The Bankruptcy Clause vests in Congress the power to "establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ..... Id. Unlike the narrow con-
struction it has given to the Taxation Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court, in Ry. Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, held that the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause requires all similarly situated
individuals to be treated the same. 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982). The Court acknowledged that it con-
strued the two Uniformity Clauses differently, despite the fact that they are both contained in Article
1, Section 8. The Court based this distinction, however, on the intent of the Framers. The Naturaliza-
tion Uniformity Clause was intended, not as an anti-discrimination provision, but rather as a grant of
exclusive power to the federal government over immigration matters. See In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755,
763-66 (6th Cir. 2003).
89. JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 46-47 (E. Scott ed., Books For
Libraries 1970) (1840). The sole power to regulate commerce was vested in the states. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV, (U.S. 1787) ("[Tlhe people of each state shall have free ingress and regress
to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject
to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that
such restriction shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state,
to any other state, of which the Owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or
restriction shall be laid by any state, on the property of the united states, or either of them.").
90. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 397 (Simon & Schuster 2001); see also PAUL C.
NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: A PUBLIC LIFE, A PRIVATE LIFE 50 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1997)
("[T]he Congress of the United States, operating under the severe restrictions contained in the Arti-
cles of Confederation .... seemed unable to cope with the young republic's growth. This was espe-
cially apparent in interstate and foreign commerce. The national economy had become sorely de-
pressed."). Not surprisingly, the economic woes of the nation led to social unrest, the most notable
event being the short-lived Shay's Rebellion, in which a group of debt-ridden farmers banded to-
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the Framers of the Constitution vested the power to regulate interstate
commerce in the federal government. 9' Some states remained concerned,
however, that the regionalism that marked the Articles of Confederation
would continue.92 These states were worried that the federal government
would use its power over interstate commerce to favor certain states.93
Some of the delegates at the Convention were fearful of conspiracies by
large states or regional combinations.94 According to Justice Story, the
Uniformity Clause was promulgated to
cut off all undue preferences of one State over another in the regula-
tion of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless duties, im-
posts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive
inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and employments of the
people of different States, might exist. The agriculture, commerce, or
manufactures of one State might be built up on the ruins of those of
another; and a combination of a few States in Congress might secure
a monopoly of certain branches of trade and business to themselves,
to the injury, if not to the destruction, of their less favored
neighbors.
95
gether and closed courthouses in order to forestall creditors. Robert A. Gross, The Uninvited Guest:
Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in IN DEBT To SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN
REBELLION 1-2 (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993).
91. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29 at 308; see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) ("[Tlhe Framers no doubt endowed Congress with
the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade
disputes that were common under the Articles of Confederation ...."); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) ("Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and
suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these
structural ills.").
92. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 308.
93. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 586-87 (2d ed. 1929). The
Clause was proposed on August 25 and adopted on August 31 without discussion. The origins of the
Uniformity Clause are linked to those of the Port Preference Clause. The Port Preference Clause
provides: "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of
one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,
clear, or pay Duties in another." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. The purpose of the Port Preference
Clause is to give "small states protection against deliberate discrimination ... by other, more power-
ful states." Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1032 n. 14 (Sth Cir. 1991) (quoting City of Houston v.
FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982)). The Port Preference Clause does not prohibit legislation
that incidentally prefers some ports over others. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir.
1990). Rather, its purpose is to prevent the federal government from discriminating between states.
Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855). Like the Tax Uni-
formity Clause, the Port Preference Clause is a limit on the federal government, and not state gov-
ernments. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876). The Port Preference Clause and the Tax Uni-
formity Clause "were proposed together and reported out of a special committee as an interrelated
limitation on the national government's commerce power." Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10 (citing
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 437). They were separated
without explanation when James Madison remedied the omission from the Tax Uniformity Clause.
Id.
94. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 307-08.
95. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 683 (T.
Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873).
A NON-UNIFORM UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX
The Uniformity Clause, therefore, is designed to ensure that Con-
gress does not impose an indirect tax on the citizens of one state different
than that imposed on the citizens of another state.96
The Uniformity Clause was proposed on August 25, 1787, and
adopted by the Framers on August 31, 1787, without discussion.97 As
adopted, the language provided that all taxes shall be "uniform and
equal" throughout the United States.98 This clause was proposed by dele-
gates from Maryland.99 But when the Committee on Style reported the
final draft of the Constitution to the Framers, it failed to include the tax
uniformity clause. 1m Two days later, however, this omission was noticed
and corrected by James Madison, who handwrote the term "uniform"
into Article I, Section 8, but omitted the term "equal."''1
1. What is "Uniformity?"
Following the ratification of the Constitution, a debate ensued as to
the scope of the Uniformity Clause. 0 2 Some argued that the Uniformity
Clause required intrinsic fairness and equality among taxpayers.'0 3 Ac-
cording to this view, a federal tax must be levied in precisely the same
manner and amount upon all individuals.'°4 Thus, a tax that treats two
people differently would not be uniform. This view found support in
Hylton v. United States,10 5 a case in which the Supreme Court was asked
to determine the constitutionality of a federal tax on carriages.' 6 In that
case, Justice Paterson stated that "[u]niformity is an instant operation on
individuals, without the intervention of assessments, or any regard to
states .... ,,I07 Similarly, Justice Iredell, voting to uphold the carriage tax,
opined that "the tax ought to be uniform; because the present Constitu-
tion was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states ...
,,108
A few years later, the Supreme Court, upholding a federal excise tax
on distillers, again lent support to the argument that the Uniformity
Clause required equality among taxpayers:
96. Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (1988), aff'd,
reh 'g granted, affd in part, rev'd in part, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993).
97. Ptas'nski, 462 U.S. at 81 n. 10.
98. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 418.
99. Luther Martin, Genuine Information, in RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 29, at 172, 205.
100. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 29, at 594.
101. CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF
CIVILIZATION 310 (Madison Books 1993).
102. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84-85.
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id.
105. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
106. Hy'lton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) at172.
107. Id. at 180.
108. Id. at 181.
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The law is not in our judgment subject to any constitutional objec-
tion. The tax imposed upon the distiller is in the nature of an excise,
and the only limitation upon the power of Congress in the imposition
of taxes of this character is that they shall be 'uniform throughout the
United States.' The tax here is uniform in its operation; that is, it is
assessed equally upon all manufacturers of spirits wherever they are.
The law does not establish one rule for one distiller and a different
rule for another, but the same rule for all alike.
109
The view that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and
equality was short-lived. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court declared once and for all that the Uniformity Clause simply re-
quires geographic uniformity. 0 That is, an indirect tax "is uniform when
it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the sub-
ject of it is found.""' There is no requirement that the tax apply equally
to all taxpayers." 12 This view was first pronounced in the Head Money
Cases,"13 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal head tax on per-
sons immigrating through port cities such as New York." 4 Challengers
of the head tax argued that it was not uniform because it applied to per-
sons immigrating at port cities but not to those immigrating at inland
cities." 15 The Court, however, sustained the tax, concluding that because
the tax applies to all port cities alike "there is substantial uniformity
within the meaning and purpose of the constitution."" 6
"Subsequent cases have confirmed that the Framers did not intend
to restrict Congress' ability to define the class of objects to be taxed.
They intended only that the tax apply wherever the classification is
found." ' 1 7 Thus, Congress may distinguish between similar classes in
selecting the subject of a tax. For example, in Knowlton v. Moore," 8 the
Supreme Court upheld a federal inheritance tax despite the fact that the
law imposed a progressive tax on legacies and varied the rate of tax
among classes of legatees. 119 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed that the
Uniformity Clause simply requires geographic uniformity and not intrin-
sic equality.
The Knowlton court gave three reasons for rejecting an intrinsic
equality interpretation of the Uniformity Clause. 20 First, if the Framers
had intended something more than geographic uniformity, there would
109. United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 11I, 121 (1872) (mem.).
110. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).
111. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594.
112. Id. at 594-95.
113. 112 U.S. 580,594 (1884).
114. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 596.
115. Id. at 594-95.
116. Id. at 595.
117. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 82.
118. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
119. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 109-10.
120. Id. at 87-89.
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have been no reason to add the phrase "throughout the United States" to
Article I, Section 8.121 That phrase clearly denotes a geographic limita-
tion and would be redundant if the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic
equality among individual taxpayers. 22 To interpret that phrase other-
wise would "lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of construction
which requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution."'
123
Second, the Framers imposed two limits on Congress's power to tax:
direct taxes must be apportioned among the states based on population,
and indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. 24 The
purpose of the apportionment clauses is to protect individual taxpayers
from paying disproportionate shares of federal taxes. 25 The apportion-
ment clauses, therefore, impose a form of intrinsic equality. 26 However,
this intrinsic equality applies only to direct taxes. 127 If the Framers had
intended to extend this intrinsic equality to indirect taxes, they would not
have distinguished the two. 28 As such, for indirect taxes, the Framers
must have intended only geographic uniformity. 29 Third, the experience
in England and the American states and colonies provided no evidence
that indirect taxes must be imposed in an intrinsically equal manner.
130
To the contrary, the experience in those jurisdictions, and the records of
the Continental Congress and Constitution Convention of 1787, made
clear that the Uniformity Clause mandates nothing more than geographic
uniformity. 3'
Ever since Knowlton, it has been clear that "the uniformity in excise
taxes exacted by the Constitution is geographical uniformity, not uni-
formity of intrinsic equality and operation. The Constitution does not
command that a tax 'have an equal effect in each State.' ' ' 132 Rather, geo-
graphic uniformity simply precludes the federal government from impos-
ing "a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state
or states."' 133 A "tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is found."' 134 Thus, a tax law
may not be "drawn on state political lines."'
135
121. Id. at 87.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 88-89.
125. Id. at 89.
126. id. at 88.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See generally id. at 89-106.
132. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 (1945) (upholding federal estate tax (quoting
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 104) (citations omitted)).
133. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12.
134. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594.
135. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.
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There is no lack of uniformity, however, simply because the subject
of the tax is not found in some states1 36 or because "differences of state
law... may bring a person within or without the category designated by
Congress as taxable .... 137 An indirect tax may affect citizens of differ-
ent states differently, as long as the purpose of the tax is not to favor the
citizens of one state over the citizens of another state. 138 "The Uniformity
Clause does not require a tax to be intrinsically uniform-that is, it is not
necessary that the tax operate upon one individual in precisely the same
manner as on all individuals."'' 39 Indeed, "[i]ndirect taxes necessarily will
effect [sic] taxpayers in various states differently since states will have
different quantities of the subject being taxed."' 140 "Perfect uniformity
and perfect equality of taxation ... is a baseless dream... .,,141 Accord-
ingly, a tax law is uniform if the same rates apply generally throughout
the United States. 1
42
2. What Are Indirect Taxes?
The Uniformity Clause identifies three categories of indirect taxes:
duties, imposts, and excises. 43 For all practical purposes, however, the
Uniformity Clause applies to any tax that is not a direct tax. 44
The 'terms duties, imposts and excises are generally treated as em-
bracing the indirect forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitu-
tion.' Therefore, if a tax is not a direct tax, it falls within the general
136. Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 359.
137. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930) ("[D]ifferences of state law, which may
bring a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read
into the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity."); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17-18
(1927) (holding that a federal estate tax credit for state inheritance taxes paid is uniform despite the
fact that Florida does not have an inheritance tax).
138. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85-86.
139. Chiles v. United States, 61 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) 88-1378, 88-1384 (D. Or. 1985).
140. Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296. "This created the possibility of most of
the revenue from the tax on this activity coming from a few states where the activity is widely con-
ducted, and very little revenue from those states where the activity is relatively unimportant." Chiles,
61 A.F.T.R.2d at 88-1384. Congress is not even prohibited from using geographic terms to define a
class of objects to be taxed. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (upholding taxation of "Alaskan oil" where the
tax was applied at the same rate in all portions of the United States where the subject of the tax was
found).
141. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595. "Is the tax on tobacco void because in many of
the state [sic] no tobacco is raised or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits void because a few
states pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?" Id. at 594.
142. Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 200 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1952) (upholding estate tax despite the
fact that some taxpayers settle with the government for less than the full rate); R.C. Tway Coal Co.
v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 595 (W.D. Ky. 1935) (upholding a tax which was uniform within a par-
ticular class as a uniform tax).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
144. The Framers themselves were uncertain as to the meaning of indirect taxes:
What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that
terms so uncertain and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution.
We shall seek in vain for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms.
There is none. We shall be as much at a loss to find any disposition of either which can
satisfactorily determine the point.
Springer, 102 U.S. at 597-98 (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
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category of indirect taxes, and it is a matter of no moment whether its
classification be further refined as a duty, or an impost, or an ex-
cise.
14 5
Whether a tax is direct or indirect depends upon what is being
taxed.' 46 "Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the posses-
sion and enjoyments of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the happen-
ing of an event or an exchange."'' 47 For example, a tax imposed upon a
particular use of property incidental to ownership is an excise tax. 48 An
excise tax is an indirect tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or
property, and is one that is "'imposed on the performance of an act, the
engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege.""
149
Another example of an indirect tax is the federal estate and gift tax,
which is imposed on the transfer of property and not the property it-
self. "°
Although different modes of assessing such duties prevail, and al-
though they have different accidental names, such as probate duties,
stamp duties .... estate taxes, or privilege taxes, nevertheless tax
laws of this nature in all countries rest in their essence upon the prin-
ciple that death is the generating source from which the particular
taxing power takes its being, and that it is the power to transmit, or
the transmission from the dead to the living, on which such taxes are
more immediately rested. 1
51
Income taxes 52 and corporate taxes1 53 are also indirect taxes be-
cause they are imposed on the earning of money and not directly on indi-
viduals or property. 54 The list of taxes found to be indirect by the Su-
preme Court is extensive.155 Indeed, in response to the contention that the
145. Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 653, 660-61 (1959) (quoting Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911) (citation omitted)).
146. Alexander Hamilton, The Defence of the Funding System, July 1795, in 19 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 22, 25 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) ("In all but direct taxes the Constitu-
tion enjoins uniformiry.").
147. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47.
148. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (finding that an estate tax, which in-
cluded gross estate transfers made in contemplation of death, is an indirect tax not subject to appor-
tionment).
149. In re Tri-Manufacturing & Sales Co., 82 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (5th ed.)).
150. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 56.
151. Id.; see also Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1930).
152. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 15 (upholding personal income tax).
153. Flint, 220 U.S. at 151-52 (upholding corporate income tax), overruled on other grounds
as noted by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 542 (1985).
154. See generally Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned" Requirement in Tax and
Nontax Accounting, 50 TAX. L. REV. 373, 412 (1995) ("Viewed as a tax on earnings, the income tax
is an indirect tax .... ).
155. Among these indirect taxes are: (I) a "license" or "special" tax upon dealers in certain
commodities, License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1866); South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437, 459, 463 (1905), overruled as stated in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528; (2) a tax on sales at
commodity exchanges, Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1899); (3) a tax on the transfer or sale
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estate tax is a direct tax, the Supreme Court swept away all logical argu-
ments with Justice Holmes's infamous statement: "Upon this point a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.' 56 The category of indirect
taxes, therefore, is "wide and comprehensive . . . in striking contrast to
the very narrow range within which 'direct' taxes have been limited...
,,157
3. The Sixteenth Amendment
The Sixteenth Amendment had no effect on the Uniformity
Clause,5 8 so federal income tax laws are still required to be "uniform
throughout the United States .... ,,159 This, of course, calls into question
the necessity of the Sixteenth Amendment. The federal government had
the power to tax income prior to the Sixteenth Amendment. 60 The sole
purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to relieve Congress of the ob-
ligation to apportion income taxes.' 6' However, only direct taxes are sub-
ject to apportionment. 162 There is no dispute today-and arguably no
dispute prior to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment-that in-
come taxes are indirect taxes and, as such, are not subject to the appor-
tionment clauses. 16 3 Ultimately, the Sixteenth Amendment serves no real
purpose.
II. CIRCUIT-SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
In recent years, the IRS has instituted an official practice of apply-
ing various parts of the Internal Revenue Code in only some states. This
occurs when the IRS disagrees with a federal circuit court's interpreta-
tion of the Code. In such cases, the IRS issues a formal opinion stating
of securities, Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 457 (1926); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S.
363, 370-71 (1904); Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 269 (1901); (4)a tax on the issuance of state bank
notes, Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 546-47; (5) a tax on manufactured tobacco having reference
to its origin and intended use, Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 615-16 (1902); (6) a tax on the manu-
facture and sale of oleomargarine, McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 50 (1904); (7) a tax on
devolutions of title to real estate, Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1874); (8) a tax on the
receipt of legacies, Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83; (9) a tax on transfers at death, N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eis-
ner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); and (10) a tax on transfers inter vivos, Bromlev, 280 U.S. at 138.
156. N.Y. Trust, 256 U.S. at 349 (holding that the federal estate tax is an indirect tax).
157. Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 661. As Woodrow Wilson proclaimed in 1885, direct taxes
are not favored in America: "All direct taxes are heartily disliked ... " WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 132 (Legal Classics Library
special ed.) (1993).
158. The Sixteenth Amendment says nothing about uniformity: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI.
159. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cf. I; Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24 (upholding that the federal income
tax is subject to the Uniformity Clause after the Sixteenth Amendment).
160. Flint, 220 U.S. at 151-52; Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 662 ("Among the numerous
indirect taxes imposed by Congress under article I, section 8, of the Constitution were the various
income taxes levied for a period of nearly 10 years at about the time of the Civil War.").
161. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
163. Flint, 220 U.S. at 150-5 I.
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that it will adhere to the circuit court's interpretation of the tax law in the
states within that circuit, but not in other states. As a result, different tax
laws are being applied in different states in direct contravention of the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause.
Three examples of the IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax
law should suffice. In a Field Service Advisory dated August 7, 1992, the
IRS was asked to opine on whether a taxpayer is entitled to interest for
the period when the taxpayer's refund checks were initially issued until
the time when they were reissued, on checks that were mailed to the
wrong address.T64 The IRS declared that the taxpayer was not entitled to
the interest, but made clear that the outcome would have been different
had the taxpayer resided in New York, Connecticut, or Vermont. 65 The
geographical distinction was due to the fact that the Second Circuit had
previously ruled, in Doolin v. United States,'6 6 that a similarly situated
taxpayer was entitled to interest. 67 The IRS, however, refused to apply
Doolin outside the Second Circuit. 68 By doing so, the IRS is applying
federal tax law differently in some states than it is in others. As a result,
residents of New York are entitled to interest but residents of California
are not.
The second example is found in Zabolotny v. Commissioner,
169
which involved the correction of a prohibited transfer under I.R.C. §
4975.170 The Eighth Circuit held that corrections under § 4975(0(5) are
automatic and thus no additional tax was owed by the taxpayers.' 71 The
IRS disagreed, opining that the taxpayers had failed to take the proper
actions to correct a prohibited sale or exchange under § 4975(c)(1)(a),
164. I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, TL-N-7623-92, 1992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7, 1992).
165. Id. The federal circuits follow state political boundaries. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B.
TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRAC7ICE § 4.01 (3d ed. 1999). The Second Circuit,
for instance, is comprised of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. Id. at § 4.04.
166. 918 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1990).
167. Doolin, 918 F.2d at 19 ("Under all the circumstances, we cannot agree that there was a
proper tender of the March 1986 check to plaintiffs; that check was therefore not a 'refund check'
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 661 1(b)(2). Accordingly, the first check that was properly ten-
dered was the March 1990 check, and plaintiffs are entitled to appropriate interest for the period
between March 18, 1986 and a date within 30 days of March 9, 1990, the date of the 'refund
check."').
168. I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, TL-N-7623-92,1992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7, 1992) ('The
Service does not intend to follow the decision in any circuit, except in the Second Circuit . .
169. 7 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 1993).
170. Zabolotny, 7 F.3d at 776. I.R.C. § 4975 imposes additional taxes on certain prohibited
transfers from qualified pension plans. I.R.C. § 4975 (2000).
171. Zabolotny, 7 F.3d at 778 n.3 ("The IRS also asserts that, because § 4975(a) imposes a
blanket prohibition on certain types of transaction regardless of the transaction's financial success
and demands a 5% of the value of the transaction from the disqualified person involved whether or
not the transaction turned out to be a 'good deal,' the same standards should apply to § 4975(b). We
disagree. Congress created a two-tier, not a one-tier, tax liability scheme, and one of the distinguish-
ing features of the second-tier tax is that instead of being imposed automatically it is avoidable
through correction. The mandatory nature of the first-tier excise tax simply does not require us to
hold that the financial consequences of the transaction to the plan are irrelevant for the purposes
determining the propriety of a second-tier excise tax liability." (citations omitted)).
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and thus, a 100 percent tax was due under § 4975(b).'72 Despite the fact
that no other circuit court had ruled on this issue, the IRS issued a
nonacquiescence and declared that it would continue to apply §
4975(f)(5) in a manner inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit's opinion, but
only for taxpayers living outside the Eighth Circuit. 7 3 Thus, taxpayers
residing in Arkansas, 74 for example, are treated differently than those
residing in Colorado.
Finally, in Revenue Ruling 72-583, the IRS declared two rules for
gifts to political campaigns. 75 If the taxpayer resides in Virginia, or any
other state outside the Fifth Circuit, 176 gifts to political campaigns are
considered taxable gifts under the federal gift tax. 177 For taxpayers resid-
ing in Texas, or any other state within the Fifth Circuit, such gifts are not
taxable. The only reason for this is that the Fifth Circuit had so held.
78
In all three examples, the IRS is applying the tax laws one way in
some states and another way in other states. The IRS's distinction is
based solely on geography, as the federal circuits are drawn on state po-
litical boundaries. The IRS's distinction is not based on state law or the
taxpayers themselves. Accordingly, this is nothing more than a non-
uniform application of the tax law by the federal government.
III. APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE TO THE IRS
"[T]he Uniformity Clause requires that an excise tax apply, at the
same rate, in all portions of the United States where the subject of the tax
is found."'179 If Congress passed a law that applied different taxes to dif-
ferent circuits, the law would undoubtedly violate the Uniformity Clause.
172. Zabolotny v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 1993), action on dec., 1994-004, 1994
WL 805237 (May 31, 1994).
173. Zabolony, action on dec., 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237.
174. The Eighth Circuit is comprised of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and South Dakota. TIGAR, supra note 165, at § 4.10.
175. Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534. Revenue Ruling 72-583 was subsequently superseded
by statute. See I.R.C. § 2501 (a)(5).
176. The Fifth Circuit is comprised of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. TIGAR, supra note
165, at § 4.07.
177. Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534.
178. Stem v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit reasoned:
The transactions in controversy were permeated with commercial and economic factors.
The contributions were motivated by appellee's desire to promote a slate of candidates
that would protect and advance her personal and property interests. To assure that the
funds would be spent in a manner consonant with the attainment of that goal, appellee
and her group retained control over the disbursement of their contributions. In a very real
sense, then, Mrs. Stem was making an economic investment that she believed would have
a direct and favorable effect upon her property holdings and business interests in New
Orleans and Louisiana. These factors, in conjunction with the undisputed findings of the
lower court that the expenditures were bona fide, at arms length and free from donative
intent, lead us, in light of what we have said above, to the conclusion that the expendi-
tures satisfy the spirit of the Regulations and are to be considered as made for an ade-
quate and full consideration.
Stern, 436 F.2d at 1330.
179. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983).
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Therefore, the IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax laws clearly
violates the spirit of the Uniformity Clause as the IRS is applying tax
laws differently to different states. However, does the IRS's circuit-
specific application of the tax law violate the letter of the Uniformity
Clause?
The Uniformity Clause is contained in Article I of the Constitu-
tion.18° By its terms, therefore, it does not limit the actions of the IRS; it
applies only to Congress.' 8' As a consequence, it may be argued that only
Congress, and not the IRS, can violate the Uniformity Clause. Such an
argument, however, would render the Uniformity Clause meaningless.
There are two ways of viewing the IRS's circuit-specific application
of the tax law. First, it could be argued that the Uniformity Clause ap-
plies only to the legislative process, and the IRS is not making law, but
simply choosing not to enforce an otherwise uniform law in some states.
The problem with this argument is that the "power to alter or repeal laws
is a legislative power and executive officers may not by means of con-
struction, rules and regulations, orders or otherwise, extend, alter, repeal,
set at naught or disregard laws enacted by the legislature."182 This is par-
ticularly true in the area of tax law, where courts have held that it is
unlawful for the IRS to adopt different enforcement policies for different
circuits: "The letter of the Commissioner [setting forth a different en-
forcement policy for the Eighth Circuit] could not have the effect of
changing the law. Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement
policy contrary to the statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful."
183
Alternatively, it could be argued that the IRS is involved in the leg-
islative process by virtue of the fact that Congress has delegated its
power to make tax law to the IRS. 184 It is well settled that the executive
branch lacks the independent power to impose taxation; only Congress
has that authority. 85 Accordingly, any power the IRS has to impose tax
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
181. As part of the executive branch, the IRS is governed by Article II of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
182. Peony Park, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 690, 695 (D. Neb. 1954); see also Inv.
Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 693 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Congress, not the Internal
Revenue Service, is the appropriate body to consider . . . substantive changes in the tax laws.");
Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (opining that an
agency's refusal to adhere to circuit court's decision is "akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War doc-
trine of nullification"); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Nonacqui-
escence renders "[tlhe judiciary's duty and authority... to say what the law is... a virtual nullity..
." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
183. Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.
184. See generally Treas. Dept. Order No. 150-2, printed in I.R.C. § 7452 (1954) (granting
revenue and taxing authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue). Congress' delegation pow-
ers are virtually unlimited. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-73
(2001).
185. Inland Prods. Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1929) ("The Revenue Acts in force
in 1918 and 1919 did not impose the soft drink tax upon sweet cider, and the regulations of the
Revenue Department attempting to impose it were void."); Inv. Annuity, 442 F. Supp. at 693 ("Con-
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law must have been delegated to it by Congress.186 When Congress dele-
gates powers to the executive branch, however, the executive branch
assumes those powers subject to the same constitutional restrictions that
limited Congress' power. 87 For example, the First Amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech..
• .,,188 By its terms, only Congress, not the executive branch, is subject to
the First Amendment. If applied literally, the executive branch could
promulgate regulations that abridge free speech with impunity. Such a
construction would, of course, render the First Amendment meaningless,
and courts have so held:
Petitioner argues that the [FCC's] regulations .. .violate the First
Amendment. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Although the text of the
First Amendment refers to legislative enactments by Congress, it is
actually much broader in scope and encompasses, among other
things, regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.•89
The same holds true for restrictions on Congress contained in Arti-
cle I of the Constitution.' 90 Congress may delegate, under Article 1, § 8,
cl. 17, its "full legislative power subject of course to constitutional limi-
tations to which all lawmaking is subservient . . . ."191 Obviously, Con-
gress cannot delegate more power than it has. 192 Otherwise, Congress
could easily avoid constitutional restrictions like the Uniformity Clause
by simply delegating authority to the executive branch. Accordingly, if
the IRS is imposing tax law- rather than enforcing it-it must do so in
compliance with the Uniformity Clause.
93
gress, not the Internal Revenue Service, is the appropriate body to consider.., substantive changes
in the law."); Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695 ("The executive branch of the government has no
power to raise revenue. That power is in the Congress by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution.").
186. Congress has the authority to delegate its Article I, § 8 powers to the executive branch.
See Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974) ("The plenary authority of Congress to
regulate foreign commerce, and to delegate significant portions of this power to the Executive, is
well established."); District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) (Congress may
delegate its "full legislative power subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all law-
making is subservient ....").
187. See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that an
agency's interpretation of the delegating statute is subject to constitutional review).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
189. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231-32 (citations omitted).
190. Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109.
191. Id.
192. Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[O]ur operating premise must be
that an agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate rules, cannot have
greater power to regulate ... conduct than does Congress.").
193. See generally Margaret L. Thum, Confusion in the Courts: The Failure to Tax Punitive
Damages Uniformly in Personal Injury Cases, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591 (1996) (arguing that
inconsistent circuit court decisions violate the Uniformity Clause); Gary L. Rodgers, The Commis-
sioner "Does Not Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001, 1030 (1980) (suggesting that inconsistent
interpretation of tax laws by courts could violate the Uniformity Clause).
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In sum, when the IRS applies tax law in a circuit-specific manner, it
is either unlawfully refusing to enforce a tax statute in certain states or
imposing a non-uniform tax law in violation of the Uniformity Clause. In
either case, the IRS's actions are unconstitutional.
IV. PROPOSAL
The IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause. The IRS, however, is
not totally to blame. The real culprit is a judicial system in which thirteen
different circuit courts independently interpret federal tax law.'9 4 When
the IRS disagrees with a circuit court's interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code, the IRS has three unappealing choices. First, it can apply
the tax law in accordance with the circuit court's interpretation in that
circuit, but not in other circuits. This is the IRS's current practice, which
arguably violates the Uniformity Clause. 195 Alternatively, the IRS could
apply the tax law in accordance with the circuit court's interpretation in
all circuits. Under this approach, each circuit court would effectively
speak for the entire nation, raising the circuit court's prominence to that
of the United States Supreme Court. This approach is not followed in
other areas of federal law,' 96 and, of course, is not feasible where there
are contradictory circuit court interpretations. 97 Finally, the IRS could,
theoretically, ignore the circuit court's interpretation altogether. 98 How-
ever, this alternative violates one of the first principles of judicial review:
a federal court's interpretation of federal law is final and controlling. 99
Accordingly, any proposal to reform the IRS's circuit-specific applica-
tion of the tax law must start with a change in the appellate process.
194. ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943) ("If we were seeking to
secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we could hardly do better than to provide
for 87 Courts [as of 1943] with original jurisdiction, II appellate bodies [now 13] of coordinate
rank, and only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court."). Appeals from
district courts are heard by the circuit court in which that district is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294
(2000). Appeals from the Tax Court are heard by the circuit court in which the taxpayer resides.
I.R.C. § 7482 (2000). Appeals from the Court of Federal Clams are heard by the Federal Circuit. 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). In all, thirteen different circuit courts hear tax appeals.
195. See supra Part I.
196. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating affirmative action
programs in Fifth Circuit only), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
197. If there were a split in circuits, the IRS, under this alternative, would have no choice but to
apply different laws in different states. Circuit splits are not uncommon in tax law. For example, the
circuits are split on whether a contingent fee is a part of the client's taxable income. Compare Foster
v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11 th Cir. 2001), Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d
353, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2000), Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curium), Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2000), and Cotnam v. Com-
missioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1959), with Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 376-
79 (4th Cir. 2001), Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2000), and Baylin v.
United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
198. This practice has been condemned by the courts. See supra note 182 and accompanying
text.
199. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Tlhe federal judiciary is supreme in the exposi-
tion of the law .... "); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
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The simplest and best solution would be to require all federal tax
appeals to be heard in a single forum. This Article, therefore, proposes
that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) by adding a provision granting
exclusive jurisdiction over federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.2°° The Federal Circuit was created to provide "a fo-
rum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law where
Congress determines that there is special need for ... uniformity. 20' For
example, in an effort to unify and stabilize the law of patents, Congress
assigned jurisdiction over virtually all federal patent appeals to the Fed-
eral Circuit. 2°2 Many argue this exclusive jurisdiction has added a needed
stability and unity to the law of patents.20 3 There is no reason the Federal
Circuit could not do the same for tax law.2° Uniformity is needed in tax
200. Such an amendment could read:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive juris-
diction-
(15) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the
United States Tax Court, or a United States District Court involving claims under Title 26
(the Internal Revenue Code).
201. S. REP. No. 97-275, at I (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14. "[T]here are
areas of the law in which the appellate courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in
which-although the rule of law may be fairly clear-courts apply the law unevenly when faced
with the facts of individual cases." Id. at 13. The Federal Circuit was designed to provide "a prompt,
definitive answer to legal questions" in these areas. Id. at II.
202. Id. at 11-17. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000):
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion ... of an appeal from a decision of--(A) the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to patent applica-
tions and interferences, at the instance of an applicant for a patent or any party to a patent
interference, and any such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant or party to pro-
ceed under section 145 or 146 of title 35; (B) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intel-
lectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks
and other proceedings as provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1071); or (C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or
154(b) of title 35.
Id. § 2195 (a).
203. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
tions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 754 (2001); Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congres-
sional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (1992) (discussing the Federal Circuit's success in fulfill-
ing Congress' desire to create uniformity in patent law); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds
in Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition--and Beyond, 14 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 104 (1998) ("The Federal Circuit has, for the most part,
been successful in achieving its primary goal of providing uniformity in patent law."); Harry F.
Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit-First Ten Years of Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 499, 504 (1992) (The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks opining that "[tihe first ten
years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence has restored efficiency and reliability to the patent law.").
204. See generally COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 73 (Dec. 18, 1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafcal
final/appstruc.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES] (suggesting that a specialized court of tax appeals is unnecessary and that the tax
appeals should be centralized in the Federal Circuit). Alternatively, Congress should create a new
appellate court to hear all tax appeals. Various tax jurists, practitioners, and academics have pro-
posed the creation of a court of tax appeals. None of these proposals however, were prompted by the
IRS's circuit-specific application of the tax law. See, e.g., H. Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals
Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975); Oscar E. Bland, Federal Tax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013
(1925); MAGILL, supra note 194, at 209; Roger J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure
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law every bit as much as patent law.2 °5 Indeed, as this Article illustrates,
uniformity of tax law is not only desirable, it is constitutionally pre-
scribed.
Congress has nearly unlimited authority to modify or expand the
appellate jurisdiction of federal courts, thus, the proposed amendment
would be constitutional.2 °6 Moreover, the Federal Circuit's interpretation
of the tax law would be final and binding on the IRS, subject only to
review by the United States Supreme Court or, in some instances, a Con-
gressional amendment to the tax law.
This proposal offers several advantages compared to the current
state of the law. Appeals from final decisions of the district courts, the
Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax Court would be heard by a single
circuit court.20 7 This would eliminate inconsistent circuit court decisions,
as all tax appeals would be decided by the Federal Circuit.
20 8 In the event
of inconsistent decisions by different panels of the Federal Circuit, the
Federal Circuit could resolve such inconsistencies en banc.
209 The Tax
210
Court has adhered to a similar policy for years.
Also, since the Federal Circuit's decision would be final, binding,
and not subject to inconsistent circuit court interpretations, non-
for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393
(1938); Charles L. B. Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 165
(1938); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1944);
Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Ap-
peals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879 (1986).
205. Wash. Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[U]niformity
among the circuits is particularly desirable in tax cases to ensure equal application of the tax system
to our citizenry .... " (quoting Gibraltar Fin. Corp. Cal. v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1987))); First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Keasler
v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985).
206. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (upholding statute removing
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions). But see United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (suggesting that Congress' power over the court's appellate jurisdic-
tion is not unlimited).
207. Under current law, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over tax cases arising out
of the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2000) ("The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal from a final decision of the
United States Court of Federal Claims; .... ").
208. Appeals would continue to be as a matter of right. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States,
13 Cl. Ct. 255, 265 n.3 (1987) (parties have a "right to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit"). Thus, the IRS could appeal any trial court decision with which it disagrees.
This would prevent the trial courts from becoming the new bastion of non-uniformity.
209. FED. CIR. R. 35(a) states:
A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal
or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in banc. Such a hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration
by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2)
when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
Id. The Federal Circuit also has the power to stay enforcement, pending appeal, or any trial court
decision. FED. CIR. R. 8(a).
210. In the Tax Court, every proposed decision of a trial judge must be referred to the chief
judge before release to assure consistency with the court's existing position. The chief judge may
refer the case to the full Tax Court for possible change. I.R.C. § 7460 (2000).
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acquiescence would not be an option for the IRS. Under the proposal, the
IRS must apply the tax law as interpreted by the Federal Circuit until
such time as the Federal Circuit's interpretation is modified or overruled
by the Supreme Court or the tax law is amended by Congress. 21 ' As a
result, the IRS would no longer have any reason to apply the tax law in a
circuit-specific manner because there would be only one circuit court
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby eliminating any
Uniformity Clause problems.
Another advantage over the current state of the law is that if the
Federal Circuit hears all tax appeals, that court may develop an expertise
in tax matters, as it has in patent cases. Scholars have recognized that:
Clearly, the Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a
higher average level than that previously found in the regional cir-
cuits, as a result of deciding over 200 patent appeals per year. The
fact that the Federal Circuit has a principal responsibility for the pat-
ent system, rather than for deciding the odd case, contributes to the
development of that expertise. 212
The same should hold true for tax appeals. 21 3 Tax law is just as intricate
and incoherent as patent law, particularly to generalized judges who
rarely encounter tax appeals. 1 4 Expertise alone may well reduce the
number of inconsistent tax law interpretations.1 5
211. See generally Questions and Answers, The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499, 572 (1983) [hereinafter Judicial
Conference] ("A single court of tax appeals, insulated as a practical matter from any but the rarest
Supreme Court review, but always subject to correction through the legislative process, inevitably
would promote uniformity and coherence. Things would not always be settled "right," as losing
litigants and the similarly situated will assert with fervor, but subject to congressional review they
will be settled. That seems to me worth a great deal.").
212. John B. Pegram, Should There be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Liti-
gation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 766, 788 (2000); see also Wamer-Jenkinson Co.,
Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); Micro Motion Inc. v. Exac Corp., 741 F.
Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting the special expertise of the Federal Circuit in patent
cases).
213. Judicial Conference, supra note 211, at 572. ("A court of tax appeals would be a special-
ist's tribunal. Sensibly, I think, it would be a tax specialist tribunal, its jurisdiction limited to and
exclusive ...over appeals of cases arising under the federal tax laws. Sacrificed in the process,
necessarily, is the leavening influence of the generalist appellate judge. Taking account of what our
Internal Revenue Code and regulations have become, and likely will remain, I think it a price worth
paying.").
214. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Every
experienced tax practitioner also knows that our Internal Revenue Code is a structured and compli-
cated instrument perhaps too complex that deserves careful and historical analysis when, as here,
longstanding provisions of that Code are challenged."); Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 705, 712 (3d
Cir. 1995) ("We cannot close this opinion without making an additional observation. It is, of course,
commonplace to note that the Internal Revenue Code is remarkably complicated. In this case, these
complications have cost the Kosses dearly. Indeed, at oral argument we were told that their debt to
the IRS now exceeds $300,000 because of the inclusion of interest. Yet it is very possible that, but
for the operation of the non-substantive, highly technical procedural provisions that have been ap-
plied, they would not owe this money. We are disturbed by the harsh result.").
215. Congress created the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding
the "contradictory decisions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom untangled
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Finally, there is no reason to believe that the Federal Circuit would
become a tool of the IRS. "No tax venue restrains the IRS's aggression
and power better than the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Other tax
venues lack the Federal Circuit's history and monetary-claim expertise.
The Federal Circuit specializes in bringing uniform justice to disputes
between the United States and its citizens."
216
CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code is interpreted by thirteen different cir-
cuit courts. The circuit courts' interpretations are not always in accord,
but they are usually final, as the Supreme Court rarely hears tax ap-
217peals. As a result, the IRS is often forced to apply different tax laws in
different circuits in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uni-
formity Clause of the Constitution. There is, however, a simple, practi-
cal, and constitutional solution to this problem. This Article proposes that
Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) by adding a provision granting
exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Such an amendment would not only unify and stabi-
lize the tax law, it would permanently solve the Uniformity Clause issue
identified in this Article.
by the Supreme Court." Paula Dwyer et al., The Battle Raging Over "Intellectual Property," Bus.
WK., May 22, 1989, at 79.
216. Christopher R. Egan, Checking the Beast: Why the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Is
Good for the Federal System of Tax Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 721, 743-44 (2003).
217. "'This is a tax case. Deny.' This was [Justice] Brennan's normal reaction to a cert request
in a tax case." BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 362 (1979); see also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 204 (infre-
quent Supreme Court review of tax cases often leaves the interpretation of the tax law unsettled for
years).
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